Human rights organisations (HROs) are the principal arbiters of the social problems or conflicts that are documented and decried as human rights issues. They do so, however, within specific socio-political milieus and histories, and through globally and locally enmeshed lenses that render some social and political problems more visible and amenable to human rights advocacy than others. This article examines the case of a controversial atrocity denial law passed in Cambodia in 2013 in order to reflect on how rights-based organisations 'think' through, navigate and intervene in the social and political worlds that they inhabit. A month before closely fought national elections in Cambodia in 2013, the government passed an anti-genocide denial law. The law was a response to statements from an opposition leader that questioned the authenticity of a key site of atrocities perpetrated under the Khmer Rouge (1975Rouge ( -1979, suggesting that it had been 'staged' by the Vietnamese. The denial law circumscribed the opposition's ability to exploit popular strands of anti-Vietnamese feeling, an undercurrent that had led to a series of violent attacks against the Vietnamese minority during the electoral cycle. Rights groups, in theory, were confronted with one of the classical dilemmas of liberal human rights: curtailment of free expression versus the potential harm of hate speech. Drawing on a series of interviews conducted with staff in domestic and international HROs in Cambodia, I situate the responses of HROs in context, showing how internationally and locally enmeshed rights discourses shape their work. I explore three questions about the world-views of HROs that have implications for rights-based work more broadly: the politicisation of human rights techniques and interventions; the (in)visibility of forms of structural violence in relief of abuses by the state; and the solubility of rightsbased advocacy within prevailing socio-political discourses and populisms.
Introduction
In May 2013, two months before a national election in Cambodia that would see the first serious challenge to the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) for over fifteen years, Kem Sokha, the then Deputy President of the opposition alliance 'Cambodian National Rescue Party' (CNRP), was recorded at a rally appearing to question the authenticity of a major prison and extermination centre established by the former Khmer Rouge regime. The Khmer Rouge (KR) 'Democratic Kampuchea' government had ruled Cambodia from 1975 to 1979, during which 1.7 million people died of starvation, disease or were executed; 2 the KR were only removed from power following a military intervention by Vietnamese troops and Cambodian rebel forces, which included leading figures of the successor government and present ruling party. The brutality of the Khmer Rouge regime, ensuing ten year Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia, and further decade of civil war that ended in 1999, continue to define key cleavages in Cambodian politics and public life. Sokha's comments were inextricably bound to the popular imagination, grievances, and continuing political currency of Cambodia's experiences of mass atrocity, conflict and occupation. They also implicate historically persistent anti-Vietnamese and nationalist sentiments that remain present in Cambodia. Sokha's comments and the government response to them, principally enacted through an anti-atrocity denial law, would spark a chain of events implicating immediate debates about free expression and atrocity denial, but also compelling questions about the role of human rights organisations (HRO) as advocates, arbiters and animators of different social issues as human rights problems. The aim of this paper is to reflect on the way HRO staff navigate, 'see' and respond to these dilemmas in their socio-political and institutional contexts.
The paper has four subsequent sections. In section two, I develop a background that tracks and explains the story of the denial law, from Kem Sokha's remarks, the CPP passing of the denial law, through to the varying public responses that followed from international and Cambodian HROs. I trace this story principally through news coverage and officially sanctioned reports or press releases related to these events, in part because the public statements and proclamations on the issues at hand both diverge from and converge with the perspectives and themes generated from interview data in important respects. In section three, I offer a brief theorisation of the work of HROs. I draw upon key literature that shows how human rights problems are registered through specific epistemic frameworks that decontextualise and de-historicise social problems, exactly at the same time as institutional and social contexts exert pressures on and condition HRO advocacy. In section four, I offer a brief methodological statement on the interviews conducted. The fifth section organises a substantive analysis of interview data around three thematic sub-sections: the politics of human rights interventions both for and against the antidenial law; the visibility of some social problems as human rights issues but not others; and the dilemmas and deliberations of HROs in 'picking battles'. I conclude with a final set of reflections on the foreclosure of serious engagement with the 'causes' rather than 'symptoms' of various human rights problems in Cambodia.
Background
Kem Sokha's comments were made in reference to the S-21 interrogation and extermination centre in Phnom Penh. During the Khmer Rouge years some 14,000 people are thought to have been interred at the site and subsequently executed.
Republic of Kampuchea' (PRK) curated S-21 as the 'Tuol Sleng Museum of Genocide Crimes' as a key evidentiary site of Khmer Rouge (KR) atrocities to legitimate the Vietnamese intervention internationally and domestically. 4 Indeed, from 1979, the PRK publicly defined itself against the 'genocidal' intent of the Pol Pot 'clique'. 5 Today, their successor regime, the CPP, still politically trades on its role as 'saviours' from the KR, using S-21 and mass graves across the country for commemorative days. S-21 today also serves wider functions, having been powerfully inserted into the nascent international tourist economy. 6 Regarding the authenticity of the site Sokha specifically said: The CPP, keen to foreclose the CNRPs ability to exploit such currents -and rarely shy of an opportunity to 'shame' an opponent -responded quickly to Sokha's comments about S-21. In June 2013, six weeks before the election, the CPP rushed legislation though the National Assembly -without scrutiny from opposition members who the CPP dominated National Assembly committee had stripped of their seats days before -criminalising the 'non-recognition, downplaying or denial' of Khmer Rouge crimes (hereafter, denial law). A breach of the law is punishable by up to two years prison sentence or a fine.
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Prime Minister Hun Sen sought to situate the proposed legislation in relief of European laws that criminalise denial of the Holocaust: "In Europe, whoever says Hitler did not kill people must be guilty". 13 In doing so, Hun Sen sought to locate the law as indigenous within an international landscape of existing legislation that is intended to counter denial -in the name of human rights -as an incitement to violence and a breach of the dignity of victims. According to this vision, denial laws work as an instrument that prioritise specific human rights protections over necessary constraints to individual freedoms. 14 Indeed, the role of denial laws as mechanisms for nurturing cultures of memory was a point of contention for several of my informants because they can be put to overtly political uses, animating questions over how denial laws appear appropriate as human rights techniques in some contexts but not others.
The CPP were not alone in objecting to Sokha's remarks. Sokha himself had suggested his remarks about S-21 had been edited, taken out of context and refused to apologise. But several survivors of S-21 condemned the suggested 'fabrication' and threatened to sue. 15 Chum Mey, an S-21 survivor and president of the 'Association of Victims of the Khmer Rouge Regime' group, further helped to organise a protest in Phnom Penh on 9 th June against Sokha, attracting some 10,000 demonstrators. 16 HROs and the CNRP pointed out, in turn, that the protests had enjoyed support from the local government authorities, and a CNRP spokesman accused the CPP of stoking outrage and 'orchestrating' the protests. 17 The denial law quickly became the focus of international HRO attention. Denunciations of the motivation, drafting, scope, and implications of the law were fierce. Article 19, a UK HRO devoted to issues of free expression, condemned the legislative process and impingements of rights to free speech, situating the denial law within a '…deteriorating human rights situation, particularly in regard to freedom of expression". 18 Amnesty International (AI), noting circumstances in which denial could legally be curtailed, argued that the denial law breached Cambodia's obligations under international law. In an open letter to the National Assembly, AI argued the denial law could inhibit post-conflict processes of reconciliation and accountability, jeopardise future scholarly research, and, with reference to anti-denial legislation in Rwanda: 19 Cumulatively, the potential negative consequences of the proposed Khmer Rouge Crimes Denial Law could exert a chilling effect on numerous aspects of daily life, causing people to fear exercising their rights to freedom of expression and engaging in public debate and contributing their views around the development of Cambodia.
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Responses among Cambodian HROs were more cautious. In the longer electoral cycle, from 2012, Cambodian HROs had expressed alarm about increasing CPP authoritarianism, intimidation, harassment, the curtailment of rights to free assembly and expression, 21 The passing of the denial law presented a complex situation for Cambodian and international HROs. In the first instance, the problem of criminalising denial provoked one of the 'classic' dilemmas of liberal human rights. On the one hand, criminalising denial breaches Cambodia's obligations to the International Covenant on Civic and Political Rights (ICCPR) as it is thought to limit free speech. In the liberal world-view enshrined in the ICCPR, such rights can only be restricted on the basis of 'reputational' damage, incitement to violence, and national security. 25 For the advocate of ICCPR rights, such curtailments are even less desirable in contexts of relative authoritarianism, which the Cambodian governments' routine use of defamation laws against political opposition seems to embody.
On the other hand, within the liberal calculus of curtailing free expression versus 'harm', denial remains a human rights problem obliging appropriate management. In the first instance, as Gregory Stanton observes, genocide denial is precipitant to further violence. 26 Secondly, the denial of atrocities can be argued as a secondary violence against victims, as it elides their experiences and dignity. Indeed, as
Hun Sen attempted to present the issue, denial laws -with precedent parallels in Europe -are just one way to manage and promote appropriate practices and cultures of memory in the wake of atrocities.
The problem here is twofold. Partly, this seems an issue of 'connecting the dots': a basic recognition that Sokha's comments might have been harmful, to be taken seriously, is understated in the context of the evidently abusive record of the Cambodian government. But the implementation of the anti-denial law was also janus faced. Ideally, denial laws are a technique for managing histories of atrocity that follow from human rights thinking, forward looking as a preventative measure against the incitement to violence and retrospectively protecting the integrity of victims' memories and dignity. Yet it seems clear that this law was mobilised in order to curtail or 'shame' the CNRP, presenting an example of a technique indigenous to human rights that was implemented principally for political gain, with little interest in the beneficial protections it purports to deliver. 27 Conversely, in the public responses to this episode, less attention has been paid to the undercurrents at work that make Sokha's comments, as an apparent expression of free speech, both politically viable and dangerous in the way they license xenophobia.
HROs cannot advocate around all social problems as human rights issues. This is a practical limitation as much a consequence of the conflicts between the different categories and genres of rights. The situation does, however, raise urgent questions about the way HROs navigate socio-political milieus, see social problems as human rights issues, and pick their attendant battles. The next section reflects on recent scholarship on how HROs work through specific sets of epistemic lenses and under specific institutional pressures.
Rights based approaches
This article responds to the wider call made by Miller & Redhead, that there is a need to think about approaches that fall 'outside'/'beyond' "rights-based approaches". 28 Rights-based approaches are increasingly prominent within a range of cognate fields such as development, 29 aid, 30 public health, 31 and poverty. 32 Indeed, Distinguishing rights-based approaches from other justice projects that might, for example, foreground 'needs' over rights, material inequalities or redistributive justice, 33 raises several sensitising questions and contradictions that resonate throughout my following discussion. One powerful attraction of rights based approaches has been the promise of 're-politicising' fields that have become 'unaccountable' or technocratic. 34 Yet rights-based approaches draw their normative authority from a corpus of international human rights laws, treaties and covenants that are legitimated precisely because of their purported universalism, objectivity and legal insulation from politics as such. This ambivalence haunts and characterises the field of rights-based advocacy, defined principally against the state, and committed to -yet apparently free from -the partialities of public political life. If we agree that there is some coherence to the 'human rights regime', in thought and practice, we are obliged to identify its key features. Human rights attract criticism for reflecting a specific Western world view; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, for example, can be read as both echoing a liberal, individualist reading of rights and as a contingent product of unequal international relationships unfolding in its drafting. 36 Fundamentally, the human rights project has been defined against states, 37 notwithstanding important critiques arguing that human rights are also implicated in moral orders that enable forms of domination in the name of rights. 38 Wendy Brown has suggested that the liberal markings of the human rights regime are visible as it is presented as an "anti-politics"; a contingent moral project that must deny that it has a politics at all. 39 On this basis, the prevailing liberal conceptualisation of human rights points to the way HROs occupy the role of -and specifically selfidentify as -the key 'neutral' and 'objective' arbiters between states and societies on this basis.
Importantly, HROs are not neutral in this process. Alex de Waal shows, HROs, operating on a transnational and proximate basis, have broadly erred toward advocacy around ICCPR rather than social or economic rights. 40 Brown's point, in turn, is that to advocate against the coercive abuses of the state through a minimalist vision of liberal rights does not void questions of power; the 'free' subject purportedly empowered by liberal rights converges with the doctrine of the market, capitalism, and attendant violences therein. 41 If the principle rationale underpinning the work of HROs is to document abuses perpetrated by states, it is imperative that we examine the 'styles of thought' through which they do so. 42 As Moon argues, predicated on the assumption that 'knowing' about and amplifying awareness of human rights problems leads to 'action' on them, HROs rely on a set of 'discursive codes' for registering and presenting knowledge about human rights violations. These are, namely, legal, statistical, and testimonial. These codes have become 'naturalized' and stabilised within the human rights report as a form of advocacy genre in its own right. The institutional configurations of HROs, through research, presentation and campaigning are now configured around these epistemic lenses and they have powerful consequences can only ever address the 'symptoms' rather than 'causes' of human rights issues, which may be deeply embedded and historically rooted forms of inequality or injustice that law is poorly disposed to register or engage.
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As a final set of cautionary reflections, we might consider how the human rights project organisationally predisposes HROs to advocate around some social problems as human rights issues but not others.
Moon notes that the dominance of legalism, testimonial, and statistical registers for human rights advocacy does not work in a uniform way across all HROs. 48 Krause's recent work on The Good Project 49 -unpacking how humanitarian relief NGOs conduct advocacy through a common, instrumental and calculative logic aimed at delivering successful projects as products for donorscarefully qualifies that it is easy to overstate the coherence of the political order within which they operate and reproduce. 50 Krause shows that there is potential for competition, divergence and conformism between different NGOs working shared contexts. Moreover, we should remain cautious about the way that human rights principles, ideas, and practices circulate globally. A neat separation of 'international' or 'transnational' and 'local' HROs is not a clean or entirely helpful series of distinctions.
HROs appropriate human rights ideas and can adapt, enunciate and act on them through proximate 'local' lenses, depending on the case at hand, even while subject to strong external pressures, such as donor funding. 51 Indeed, the question of organisational survival is subject to the vagaries of varying donor priorities, which have changed greatly over recent decades in Cambodia, adding additional layers of complexity to the forms of advocacy that HROs are willing to undertake. 
Interviews
In the following sections, I discuss data generated from eleven interviews with HRO leaders and staff who were working in Cambodia at the time of the passing of the denial law, as well as one interview 
Human rights interventions
The CPP justified the denial law on the basis of several themes that are indigenous to human rights thinking. Firstly, the CPP argued that the denial law would prevent further harm to victims of the KR arising from comments such as Kem Sokha's. Secondly, the CPP argued that equivalent laws existed in Europe and other countries that criminalised revisionism of the Holocaust, and therefore the CPP were simply adopting similar protections with precedents in Western contexts. Against these claims, as outlined, public condemnation of the law was robust, especially among international HROs, arguing that the law was politically designed to harm the opposition and had implications for free expression and the human rights situation more broadly. Three years on from the passing of the denial law, nobody had been charged under the legislation. The situation presents a puzzle beyond a straightforward contradiction of liberal human rights obligations to protect free speech and a more assertive need to prevent denial and dignify victims.
The public proclamations at the time of the passing of the denial law, for or against, elided the possibility that the furore, condemnation, and protests were being made to stand for meanings that they did not necessarily reflect or embody. As one international HRO staff member explained to me, while suggesting the law was fairly singularly an attack on the CNRP:
The law was obviously a response to Sokha's comments. Looking back, it was about the election.
It was political point scoring. But I also don't see this going anywhere. Sokha's remarks were just opportunistic so I wouldn't read too much into them. And the law also wasn't going to be used against anyone but the CNRP. It's fairly standard stuff on the political scene here.
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A political journalist working at an English language national newspaper during the election cycle elaborated on similar themes:
Of course, without a doubt the law was linked to Sokha's comments. That came at a time when the CPP was doing a lot of things to discredit the CNRP, particularly Kem Sokha… Sokha put his foot in his mouth and the CPP jumped with this law as a way to publicly shame him without even having to get too much flak. After all, who would publicly take Kem Sokha's side on this issue? …Truthfully, I don't think there is much consequence. I think this was always meant to be a political tool and would never be used for anything else… It was sort of a silly way to shame Kem Sokha on a public stage, particularly in front of the international community that had been so supportive of the CNRP all along… I guess I'd say both the law and the criticisms of it were somewhat disingenuous. The law didn't have much to do with helping the populace but nor did it have to do with curtailing free speech… Of course people should be free to question things, but in my experience most rarely discuss the [KR], let alone trade conspiracy theories on a regular basis.
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If the denial law was a principally 'political' tool, deployed less for protecting the dignity of survivors, while at the same time perceived as posing little threat to civic life and free speech, should the law simply be read as a 'red herring' without consequences? The corollary problem, here, is that the public condemnation that followed from across international and domestic HROs around the denial law is rendered, in a similar light, perfunctory. This is not to trivialise the problems of free expression in Cambodia, which are serious and ongoing. The quandary points analytically, however, to several possibilities for the sociology of human rights. Sara Ahmed's concept of "non-performativity" is potentially fruitful here. 55 While a 'performative' speech act brings into existence, affirms and constitutes what it names, Ahmed's work on claims of anti-racism identifies forms of speech actspecifically, declarations of anti-racism -which effect their appearance, but actually foreclose discussions of racism and inequality. In regard to Cambodia's denial law, Ahmed's concept works both ways. As the CPP proclaims the need to outlaw denial, in the name of protecting the memories of victims and deterring hate speech -imperatives themselves indigenous to human rights protectionsthey work to effect a foreclosure of precisely those topics as settled and indisputable. In this sense, we might analyse the denial law less as a case of contradictions between rights to free expression and rights to protection from hate speech, and more as the "anti-performance" of human rights by the state: an intervention said to generate specific human rights outcomes -in this case protecting a historical record -actually shuts down engagements with that past. The corollary problem, in turn, is that as HROs are drawn into responses denouncing the implications the law poses for free speech, invariably and necessarily against the state, they risk foreclosing the question of whether 'denial' or 'hate' are problems at all. We will return to these outstanding questions shortly.
My interview informants broadly shared the sense that the legislation was dislocated from questions of either 'denial' or 'free speech', pointing to the denial law as a political tactic motivated to discredit the opposition running counter to basic rights protections, but with little substantive consequence. While my informants expressed surprise at Sokha's initial comments and some questioned how anyone could 'take his side', one former Cambodian NGO staff member explained It seems to me the CPP wanted to discredit Kem Sokha and it is useful to keep in mind that elections were just around the corners at that time. But it produced the opposite. As many have suggested, the public demonstrations against Kem Sokha had elevated him from an obscure politician to a nationally known figure. In retrospect, it's hard to believe the demonstrations hurt him. In this case, the law was a means to a political end. In Cambodia, sometimes laws are passed to punish a particular individual. e.g the adultery law passed in 2006 and the same is true for the anti-denial law. It's politics as usual. 
'Seeing' human rights issues
International HROs condemned the passing of the denial law on the basis that it was passed without debate, too broadly defined, and would cause both immediate and wider negative impacts on free speech in Cambodian society. These denunciations were registered specifically through and against The journalist's comments are telling in the way that they seem to animate a distinction between 'spectacular' or high profile (visible) forms of denial and the possibility of more politically continuous views that might reflect revisionism. On the one hand, the repertoires of denial employed during defence testimony at war crimes trials, contesting the historical record of atrocities, are a product of exercises that are presented and legitimated as a deliberative reconstruction of 'historical truth'. 61 On the other hand, the journalist's comments on the former KR in Anlong Veng (a stronghold of the movement until 1999) -lower level perpetrators of atrocity who now reside in Cambodia's northern and western border areas -raises questions about the way discourses of nation and 'race' can reframe history in the present.
As I have argued elsewhere, former members of the KR will often celebrate their former leaders, assert their apparent benevolent as patriots who sought to defend their country exactly at the same time as they acknowledge the history of atrocities in Cambodia and endorse a tribunal to account for their crimes. 62 Moreover, in Anlong Veng, I encountered younger Cambodians visiting the town and former houses and heritage sites of KR leaders specifically because they were attracted to sites marking the lives of Cambodians who fought the outsiders i.e. Thailand and Vietnam. 63 My intention here is not to present these examples as evidence of pervasive revisionism as such -neither endorsing the current law nor prescribing the regulation of denial -but would suggest the possibility that denial and revisionism in Cambodia are contextually more complicated than international HROs seemed to register in their public proclamations around the passing of the law.
One senior figure in an international HRO again downplayed denial as singular problem. While noting links between Sokha's comments on S-21, the potential for electoral gain, he also identified important factors beyond, involving pressures and grievances arising from migration, integration and 'race'. to articulate a xenophobic anti-Vietnamese politics. What is crucial for our purposes, here, is that xenophobia, as discursive undercurrents and potential sources of political capital, prefigure and generate the forms of denial that are identified above. Denial is therefore a symptom of wider and systemic patterns of xenophobia and division. As another Cambodian HRO leader suggested, when asked why people might blame the Vietnamese for atrocities perpetrated:
It seemed people referred to "Cambodian members of KR who were Pro-Vietnamese communists"
and maybe "Vietnamese members of the KR" as well. Such comments were made not because they do not like the CPP as a few said this right after the collapse of the KR; nor because they were KR themselves and wanted to blame someone else. Such statements truly reflect on-going present day problems of extreme nationalism.
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The connection here is that wider formations of atrocity denial can emerge from contemporary or continuing xenophobia, as much as Kem Sokha's comments were bound to any opportunistic electoral currency they may have had. While there is an implication that the problem of denial exists beyond partisan politics, other interviewees pointed to the way that the histories of atrocities in Cambodia are heavily implicated in the political cleavages that emerged after the KR years. These either portray the Other informants shared a view of denial as defined by the acceptance of a historical record of violence, even as they suggested that anti-Vietnamese feelings were productive of politicised accounts of blame for atrocities; (such readings were notably labelled as denial by other informants). As one Cambodian human rights advocate suggested
Actually there were older people who went through the regime. When they tell their story about the regime to their children, the children don't believe. There isn't really anyone who bravely stands up and says 'it didn't happen'. And for the public figures who say it was the Vietnamese, or
Vietnamese policy, it was opposition politics and politicians who say this based on their analysis, you know yuon, they created the Khmer Rouge… For Kem Sokha himself, he didn't author these kinds of sentences… the anti-Vietnamese sentiment was the core thing, for picking up votes 73 Here, disbelief within the generational reproduction of memories is deemed a problem, whereas the politicisation of the historical record is not. Recognising denial, in light of these comments, is an uneven and contingent process. Two tendencies seem apparent. The Cambodian HRO staff I interviewed connected both Kem Sokha's comments to broader currents of xenophobia, notwithstanding those above that did situate his remarks within wider patterns of denial and revisionism, historical and present.
Moreover, Cambodian HRO staff were well attuned to fact that if a government trades off a specific political history to nurture its legitimacy as the CPP have, its opponents are necessarily invited to contest that history thereupon. It is notable also that the Cambodian HRO staff, broadly, while surprised about Sokha's remarks, fell into line in expressing condemnation of the CPP law on the grounds of violations of ICCPR rights. There is of course no contradiction between recognising patterns of xenophobia, or denial too, while denouncing the CPP law; recognising that denial or hate speech is a problem does not obviate, self-evidently, either the need to regulate them, let alone endorse the denial law in the form
presented. Yet the relative public quiet over issues of xenophobia and denial and failure to publicly connect them -especially in relief of interview statements that recognise them as problems -leads us back to urgent questions about how HRO pick their battles and navigate the social contexts in which they inhabit.
Picking battles, following projects and the problem of populism
The CPP has an appalling record according to international human rights standards, historically and today. The state closely regulates political protest, and violence against protestors has increased, recently including the use of live rounds against demonstrators leading to several deaths. 74 In July 2016, a prominent government critic, Kem Ley, was murdered in a suspected political assassination. 75 HROs in Cambodia operate subject to formal, informal and immanent threats of constraint as they navigate a political landscape in which human rights abuses perpetrated by the state and state backed agents are pervasive. Domestic Cambodian HROs, in particular, who are already more vulnerable to the vagaries of changing donor priorities, are also more exposed to the Cambodian government. The continuous work of HROs in documenting and calling to account the abuses of the CPP is remarkable in its own right.
The liberal vision of civil society, conceptualised as a neutral counterweight and check to authoritarian government, elides the complexity of the institutional pressures and dilemmas confronting HROs. In Cambodia, domestic HRO were supported in their critiques of the denial law partly because larger international HROs had spoken out in this process, staking out the terrain of the ICCPR rights that were purportedly under threat. Indeed, as one senior Cambodian HRO staff pointed out, "It was easier for the bigger foreign organisations to say something… They don't need to be sensitive to local public views."
76 It would, however, be wrong to suggest that domestic HROs automatically followed the lead of the larger groups, or that they required the 'cover' afforded by the larger organisations' work to advance their case as a necessity. As I have shown, there appears to be several significant discordances between public proclamations about the human rights problems presented by the denial law and the more nuanced perspectives of HRO staff and leaders in assessing the complexities of issues at hand, especially in linking Sokha's comments to xenophobia and wider questions about the presence of atrocity denial in Cambodia.
In Government who dare to protect the rights of the minority Vietnamese. The main problem here after the Vietnamese troops left Cambodia, is the weak application of the immigration law for Vietnamese immigrants and make many Cambodian worry that they will become minority in their own country if we let the situation like this be continued…
As human rights activists, we try to push our Government to strengthen the control of immigrants in order to reduce the xenophobia sentiment of our people. It's a legitimate concern of Cambodian people who see this situation of no control of immigrants… especially from Vietnam, because we have bad memory in the past centuries of losing our territory by the occupation of Vietnamese civilians and troops. Many Cambodians, they don't like to see this happen again in the near future.
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According to this picture, the role of the HRO in Cambodia is doubly fraught. They are under pressure from the state though also operate in a context that is pregnant with wider tensions around issues of nationalism, difference, and 'race'. On this basis we might revisit the question of who HROs are meant to work for. As a Cambodian HRO acquiescing to and advocating for national border controls, a tension seems to emerge between the silo of national concerns that shapes organisational priorities, constraining them from advocating some causes, and the enshrinement of universalising human rights principles that is the rationale for their work and existence. HROs will always adapt human rights principles to fit local contexts, and work according to contextually driven priorities. But even here, as a seemingly palliative measure against patterns of xenophobia, symptoms of human rights problem are not simply prioritised over their causes; they render causes invisible.
The risk presented, starkly, is that HROs that conceptualise their own role as organisational counterweights to an abusive state can slip into positions that, by virtue of their commitments and opposition to the centralised power of authoritarian government, can appease wider political undercurrents that can themselves be generative of human rights problems. These world views seem detached from the normative, cosmopolitan ideals of the human rights project that are thought to underpin their work.
Here, the "anti-politics" of human rights, defined against the state, conceals the way that HROs cannot conduct advocacy free from social context, divorced from wider populist currents, and in the apolitical void implied by human rights legalism.
Conclusion
The Cambodian denial law passed in 2013 generated a series of condemnatory responses among HROs, flagging the denial law as one further episode in a continuing pattern of human rights abuse by the Cambodian government, and a straightforward bid to constrain the opposition CNRP in the build up to the national election. These condemnations can be read through the world view of international and domestic HROs working in Cambodia, which prioritise liberal ICCPR issues, and tend to register human rights problems through the lens of a legalism that is itself decontextualising and de-historicising. I have pointed out that the public furore over the denial law foreclosed attention toward prevailing currents of xenophobia, specifically as they can generate forms of atrocity denial that could also be taken seriously as human rights problems in their own right. As several interviews suggested, these problems are persistent and present, but are at odds with both a wider popular hostility toward minority issues and Wendy Brown's critique of the modern human rights regime is powerful in the way it asks a simple question (2004): is this the most we can hope for? As a minimalist vision of human rights enables HROs to advocate against governmental abuses, Brown invites us to think through the implications of the apparently 'pure' and 'free' human rights subject who escapes the coercive force of the idealised authoritarian state. 80 Brown's point is that power is never absent, but an ambivalent force; HROs only ask to substitute one relation of subjectification for another. What is at stake in the case at hand is simpler in its analytical, empirical and normative implications. What if the CPP had not confronted Sokha's claim that a site of mass atrocity was fabricated by an apparently eliminatory racial enemy?
What if no one had spoken out? This is not an endorsement of the denial law, or the prescription for regulating speech about atrocities in Cambodia. It is simply a provocation to HROs to further consider their role as the apparent arbiters of basic principles of equity, dignity and human protection. 
